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Race and
Capital Punishment
by
Michael L Radelet
Whether it be lynching or legally-imposed capital pun-
ishment, the threat or use of death as a punishment has
been a powerful means of class and race intimidation
throughout American history. In the nineteenth century,
statutes that explicitly considered race were not uncom-
mon; in Virginia, for example, the statutes of 150 years
ago listed five capital crimes for whites and 70 for black
slaves. 1 Today, historians interested in capital punishment
use records of state compensations to slave owners to
learn how many slaves were executed.
The federal government's statistics on executions date
from the 1930s. Between 1930 and 1967, 3,859 prisoners
were executed in the United States, 54 percent of whom
were black. There were 455 executions for rape, and 405 of
the defendants (89 percent) were black. 2 There are no
known cases in American history in which a white man
was executed for the rape of a black woman.
Executions were temporarily halted in 1967, and in
1972 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated all existing
death penalty statutes. 3 They did so in large part because
they found the penalty to be arbitrarily applied, and
hence cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Many thought that decision would
forever end the legality of the death sentence in the United
States. But in the last 15 years, some 36 states and the fed-
eral government have successfully reinstituted death pen-
alty statutes, 75 inmates have been executed, and today
1,900 men and women live under sentences of death. 4 If
present rates double to a national pace of one execution
per week, we will still not eliminate our current backlog of
death row prisoners until the year 2023.
The most significant (indeed, the only) progress made
in the last 20 years in reducing racial disparities in execu-
tions was a 1977 Supreme Court decision that outlawed
the death penalty for those convicted of rape. 5 If we exam-
ine only executions for murder, we learn that between
1930 and 1967, 50.1 percent of the executions involved
nonwhites. Today, 49.3 percent of those on death row, all
of whom stand convicted of murder, are nonwhite. Thus,
all the efforts to revise death penalty statutes in the last 15
years to make them more fair have reduced the relevant
minority population by less than one percent.
The death penalty remains a southern phenomenon.
With the exception of five "consensual" executions
(where the inmates dropped their appeals), all American
executions in the last 20 years have been in the former
states of the Confederacy. In the 1980s, all of the 11
former Confederate states, save Arkansas and Tennessee,
have executed at least two inmates.
Research that examined the question of racial bias in
the application of the death penalty before the 1972
Furman decision was plentiful, alarming in its exposure
of racial bias, and methodologically limited. 6 7 Research
looking at who has been condemned since 1972 has found
that while sentencing is still correlated with race of defen-
dant, the race of the victim exerts the strongest predictive
power. While some of this research has exposed racial bias
in the presentencing decisions made by prosecutors, the
bulk of the work has focused on sentencing disparities. 8 9
The first such study examined over 16,000 homicide
cases in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio. 10 Results indi-
cated that, even when controlling for whether or not the
homicide involved an accompanying felony, black defen-
dants convicted of killing whites were more likely to re-
ceive the death penalty than were defendants in any of the
other three racial configurations. Radelet, in a study of
Florida homicides that occurred between strangers,
found similar patterns, as did Jacoby and Paternoster in
South Carolina. 911 In a more comprehensive study, Gross
and Mauro used the FBI's Supplemental Homicide Re-
ports to examine sentencing patterns in eight states
(Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia). 12 Even when the
data were adjusted for felony circumstances, the defen-
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. . . It will be interesting to see how
long it will take before our legislators
realize that too much racism and too
many killings have already occurred.
dant-victim relationship, etc., the racial disparities —
along lines of the victim's race— still remained.
A simple observation illustrates the problem. In Flor-
ida, since its current death penalty statute was passed in
1972, about 45 percent of the murder victims have been
black. However, of the 400 defendants sentenced to death
over this period, only 10 percent had black victims. 1314
The results of the above research closely parallel the
conclusions reached by David Baldus and his colleagues,
who examined sentencing patterns in Georgie. 15 16 Their
work has been widely hailed as the most sophisticated,
detailed, and meticulous study ever conducted on sen-
tencing patterns in the United States. The study examined
over 2,000 Georgia murders that occurred from 1973
through 1979. Statewide, defendants charged with killing
whites were sentenced to death in 11 percent of the cases,
whereas those charged with killing blacks were con-
demned in only one percent of the cases. The defendant's
race had a significant effect on sentencing, but was not as
strong as race of victim. In trying to explain this associa-
tion, data were collected on some 230 additional variables
that might be hypothesized as affecting sentencing, such
as defendant's prior record, etc. However, even when the
effects of these variables were controlled, those charged
with killing whites were still 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than were defendants charged with
killing blacks. Overall, Baldus concluded that in Georgia
almost one-third of the death sentences were imposed as
the result of race-of-victim discrimination.
What is being done about this problem? Judicial reme-
dies have been sought and denied, so the battles are now
being joined in the legislatures. With the support of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the results of the Baldus
study were recently presented to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In an April 1987 decision, a sharply-divided Court ruled
5 to 4 that because the study did not prove intentional
racial discrimination, it was insufficient to demonstrate a
constitutional violation. 17 The lengthy decision assumed
the validity of the Baldus study but dismissed it as irrele-
vant. Georgia may use its death penalty in a racially dis-
criminatory fashion, the Court ruled, as long as the dis-
crimination is not intentional.
The country's civil rights leadership was active in at-
tempting to make the racist use of the death penalty a pri-
ority issue long before the Court ruled in the McCleskey
case, albeit, mysteriously, the majority of blacks voice
support for executions. Julian Bond, John Conyers, Jesse
Jackson, Coretta Scott King, Joseph Lowrey, and An-
drew Young, among many others, have been outspoken in
their opposition to the death penalty. As the frequency of
executions increases over the next few years, it will be in-
teresting to see how long it will take before our legislators
realize that too much racism and too many killings have
already occurred.
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